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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, Leslie Sebba opened his Law and Contemporary Problems article on 
sentencing reform with an apology.1 He described how his study of Israel’s 
introduction of suspended sentences, which grant judges the authority to suspend 
the sentences of individuals facing prison such that they ultimately may not serve 
them, was successful in reducing prison sentences in the early 1960s. This success 
led him to recommend that English authorities adopt suspended sentences, 
arguing that they would replace prison sentences. As Sebba described in his 
article, the result in England was very different than the one in Israel.2 Building 
upon the legal transplants literature3 and the policy transfer literature,4 he 
showed that sentencing policies are so complex and inextricably linked to other 
policy features unique to each state that it is difficult to apply policy 
recommendations in one system based on the experiences of another system. 
This article will show that there is an even more fundamental problem in the 
attempts to draw valid policy conclusions from sentencing research. Not only is 
it difficult to transfer conclusions from studies of one system to another, but an 
alternative measure that was once proven to reduce imprisonment in one system 
may not even continue functioning as an effective alternative to imprisonment in 
the same system at a later stage. Initial success does not immediately suggest 
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 1.  Leslie Sebba, Is Sentencing Reform a Lost Cause? A Historical Perspective on Conceptual 
Problems in Sentencing Research, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2013, at 237. 
 2.  Id.; see also Anthony E. Bottoms, The Suspended Sentence in England, 1967–78, 21 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5–8 (1981). 
 3.  See e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
(1993). 
 4.  See CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND POLITICAL CULTURES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF CRIME CONTROL 3–7 (Tim Newburn & Richard Sparks eds., 2004); see also Tim 
Newburn, Atlantic Crossings: ‘Policy Transfer’ and Crime Control in the USA and Britain, 4 PUNISHMENT 
& SOC’Y 165, 165–94 (2002). 
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sustainable, long-term success since studies are often conducted soon after a new 
type of sentence is introduced, so many of the conclusions from these sentencing 
studies do not continue to hold following later developments. 5 
This article takes the same example used by Sebba—the Israeli suspended 
sentence sanction6—and another Israeli community service example called 
Service Labor as case studies.7 This article shows how, even in the same system, 
a sanction can successfully reduce prison sentences when introduced and initially 
analyzed, but then have an unintended or potentially very different effect over 
time. Sometimes, it might even increase incarceration at a later stage. 
In particular, as time passes, the legislature and the courts tend to forget the 
original purpose of the law, and without referring to that original purpose, change 
the nature of the reform. Laws that were originally adopted to reduce 
incarceration are, with the passage of time, amended and interpreted in ways that 
increase incarceration.8 These amendments and court decisions, by neglecting the 
original intent and function of a law without even referring to it, might change 
the nature of the reform, leading to a very different use of a measure that 
originally succeeded in reducing imprisonment.9 
This article concludes that the short-term success that alternatives to 
imprisonment have in reducing incarceration does not necessarily ensure long-
term success. Legislation that reduces imprisonment in the short term might 
result in increased incarceration in the long term. This article even concludes, 
albeit cautiously, that legislatures should not rely on new alternatives to 
imprisonment as a means to reduce incarceration in the long term. 
This article will try to substantiate this thesis as follows. Following this 
introduction, Part II, shows that suspended sentences mainly replaced sentences 
of immediate imprisonment shortly after this penalty was introduced to Israeli 
law in 1954. Part III describes the decade following this legislative reform and 
shows how judicial decisions and legislation inadvertently planted the seeds that 
would later change the nature of suspended sentences from mainly an alternative 
to imprisonment to a supplement to immediate imprisonment sentences.  Part III 
 
 5.  This observation is also mirrored in Webster and Doob’s study of Canadian sentencing, where 
the initially successful conditional sentence was later seen as having “largely failed to deliver.” See Cheryl 
Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, Missed Opportunities: Canada’s Experience with the Conditional 
Sentence 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2018, at 163. 
 6.  Hok HaOnshin (Penal Law) 5737–1977, §§ 52–60, SH No. 2067 p. 26–28 (Isr.), translated in 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/43289694.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY5B-
KTXF]. 
 7.  Id. §§ 51A–51K, p. 22–26. 
 8.  For a similar development of suspended sentences in England and Wales, see Bottoms, supra 
note 2, at 9 (showing that, despite the clear intention of the legislature and the court of appeal in R. v. 
O’Keefe ([1969] 2 Q.B. 29) that suspended sentences should only replace sentences of immediate 
imprisonment, later decisions by the courts and subsequent parliamentary amendments led to a different 
result). 
 9.  See e.g., Mona Lynch, Mass Incarceration, Legal Change, and Locale: Understanding and 
Remediating American Penal Overindulgence, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 673, 681 (2011) 
(explaining how changes to statutes and legal policies might be put into practice in ways “contrary to the 
stated goals of the formal laws or that subvert the aims of the legal change in question”). 
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also analyzes the long-term effects of the decisions in this decade and shows that, 
with the passage of time, suspended sentences probably increase, instead of 
decrease, incarceration in Israel. Part IV takes another case study—
imprisonment via service labor—and shows that while this measure was less 
successful as an alternative to incarceration from the start, it has, with the passage 
of time, likewise led to an increase in incarceration contrary to the original intent 
with which it was enacted. Part V concludes that even when studies show that an 
alternative to imprisonment is successful in reducing incarceration, these 
alternatives might do the exact opposite in the long run. 
II 
SUSPENDED SENTENCES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INCARCERATION—THE 
FIRST DECADE 
A. The Suspended Sentence and Probation 
In Israel, a suspended sentence is a sentence of imprisonment that the 
defendant has to serve only if he is convicted of a further offense that has been 
specified by the sentencing court—called the breach offense—within the 
conditional period set by that court.10 In fact, in Israeli Penal Law, this penalty is 
called the Conditional Imprisonment Penalty, but since the term suspended 
sentence is better known outside of Israel, the article will use that term here.11 
When the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, decided to adopt suspended 
sentences in 1954,12 Israel already had a well-developed probation system.13 
While in England it was sometimes argued that there was nothing to be gained 
by adding suspended sentences alongside probation,14 the debate in the Israeli 
parliament showed a general agreement that Israel needed to introduce 
 
 10.  The conditional period in Israel can be between one and three years. For further discussion of 
the nature of suspended sentences in different jurisdictions, see Richard S. Frase, Suspended Sentences 
and Free-standing Probation Orders in U.S. Guidelines Systems: A Survey and Assessment 82 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2018, 51; Arie Freiberg, Suspended Sentences in Australia: Uncertain, Unstable, 
Unpopular and Unnecessary? 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2018, 81. The history of the suspended 
sentence is surveyed in MARC ANCEL, SUSPENDED SENTENCE (1971). See also Marc Ancel, The System 
of Conditional Sentence or Sursis, 80 L. Q. REV. 334 (1964). 
 11.  Hok HaOnshin (Penal Law) 5737–1977, § 52, SH No. 2067 p. 26 (Isr.), translated in 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/43289694.pdf [https://perma.cc/585T-
F6RP]. 
 12.  Penal Law Amendment (Methods of Punishment), 5714–1954, § 18, p. 235. 
 13.  Probation of Offenders Ordinance 3, 1944. 
 14.  In England the proposal to institute suspended sentences was originally rejected by the Advisory 
Council on the Treatment of Offenders in 1952 and again in 1957. The main reason was that there was 
nothing to be gained by adding the suspended sentences alongside probation. The Council concluded 
that: “[t]he suspended sentence is wrong in principle and to a large extent impracticable. It should not be 
adopted, either in conjunction with probation or otherwise.” GREAT BRITAIN HOME OFFICE, REPORT 
OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS: ALTERNATIVES TO SHORT TERM 
IMPRISONMENT 32 (1957); see also Leslie Sebba, Penal Reform and Court Practice: The Case of the 
Suspended Sentence, in STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY 133, 135 (Israel Drapkin ed., 1969); Bottoms, supra 
note 2, at 1–4; Arnold Enker, The Suspended Sentence: Israel’s Experience, 14 ISR. L. REV. 369, 373–75 
(1979). 
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suspended sentences.15 In fact, during this legislative process it was emphasized 
that suspended sentences should not replace probation sentences.16 Rather, 
suspended sentences were useful when the defendant was unfit for probation or 
when probation was not severe enough for the offense. 
The debate focused on combining suspended sentences with probation. While 
the original bill proposed combining probation orders together with suspended 
sentences, the Probation Service argued that the two sanctions were 
incompatible. 17 The suspended sentence, it was argued, was a form of punishment 
meant to deter, while probation was meant to rehabilitate. The Probation Service 
succeeded in convincing the Knesset, and the original 1954 law did not allow 
probation orders to be added to suspended sentences.18 Yet, this changed 
following the 1963 amendment. The legislative bill explained that the supervision 
of a probation officer could assist the convict and supply an additional 
preventative measure to reduce recidivism.19 Today, courts may add 
probationary supervision to a suspended sentence order.20 
The suspended sentence has some similarities to probation since, in both 
cases, if the convicted defendant does not breach the court order during the 
specified period of time, he or she can avoid imprisonment. Yet a suspended 
sentence differs from probation in several respects. First, a probation order can 
include a variety of different terms;21 whereas the only condition attached to a 
suspended sentence is the requirement not to commit a breach offense during the 
term of suspension.22 Second, a probation officer supervises the fulfilment of the 
probation order, whereas no one actively supervises a suspended sentence.23 
Third, when probation is revoked the defendant is brought in for resentencing, 
where the court decides whether to impose an alternative sentence and which 
sentence to impose.24 In contrast, in the case of a breach of a suspended sentence, 
the court is obligated to simply activate the pre-determined prison sentence that 
was set following the initial offense.25 Fourth, while probation cannot be added 
 
 15.  The perceived success of suspended sentences in some European jurisdictions and the need to 
enlarge the available penal options were mentioned as justification for the introduction of suspended 
sentence in Israel. See Penal Law Amendment (Methods of Punishment) Bill, 5714–1953, § 15, p. 7; DK 
(1953) 228, 231 (Isr.). 
 16.  Sebba, supra note 14, at 144. 
 17.  Penal Law Amendment (Methods of Punishment) Bill, 5714-1953, § 16, p. 7. 
 18.  Sebba, supra note 14, at 157–58; Enker, supra note 14, at 380–81; cf. The Constitution, Law and 
Justice Committee, Rep No. 7/C, 2d Knesset, at 5 (Feb. 15, 1954). 
 19.  Penal Law Amendment (Methods of Punishment) Bill, 5722–1962, § 18A, pp. 246, 254. 
 20.  See Probation Ordinance (New Version), 5729–1969, § 1(1)(b)(2). 
 21.  Id. § 5. 
 22.  Hok HaOnshin (Penal Law) 5737–1977, § 52, SH No. 2067 p. 26 (Isr.), translated in 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/43289694.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DQ9-
HLCZ]. 
 23.  Probation Ordinance (New Version), 5729–1969, §4(b). 
 24.  See id. §§ 16–17, 20. 
 25.  Hok HaOnshin (Penal Law) 5737–1977, § 55, SH No. 2067 p. 27 (Isr.), translated in 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/43289694.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX2D-
KKJ5]. 
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to sentences of immediate imprisonment, following a 1963 amendment to Israeli 
penal law, suspended sentences can be added to any type of sentence.26 Finally, 
probation can be imposed as an alternative to conviction when the court decides 
that the consequences of conviction are disproportionally harsh and the violation 
was minor.27 In fact, in theory (though, as we show below, not necessarily in 
practice) the court should first decide to sentence the defendant to imprisonment 
and only then decide whether to make all or part of the imprisonment term 
conditional. 
B. The Original Goals of Suspended Sentences 
The government mentioned two reasons for introducing the suspended 
sentence in 1954. First, the suspended sentence aimed to replace immediate 
imprisonment for first-time offenders, when the offense severity justified 
imprisonment.28 Second, it was intended for cases where immediate 
imprisonment was too severe, yet probation was unfitting and recognizance or 
fines were not severe enough.29 Two additional reasons were mentioned during 
the debate in the Knesset. The Minister of Justice said that the suspended 
sentence was also needed to help reduce prison overcrowding.30 The Attorney 
General mentioned a fourth goal: the replacement of short incarceration 
sentences.31 In his view, after the introduction of the suspended sentence, there 
would no longer be a need for short, immediate prison sentences.32 
The second goal mentioned above indicates that suspended sentences were 
introduced not only as an alternative to immediate imprisonment, but also as an 
intermediate sanction—harsher than fines or probation but more lenient than 
immediate imprisonment—designed to ensure a proportional response that 
existing penalties did not allow.33 Still, though the Knesset expected that in some 
cases it would also replace fines34 and recognizance,35 the primary purpose and 
 
 26.  Penal Law Amendment (Methods of Punishment) (Amendment No. 5) Law 5723–1963, § 18(a). 
 27.  Probation Ordinance, § 1(2). 
 28.  Penal Law Amendment (Methods of Punishment) Bill, 5714–1953, p.10. However, the wording 
of the law does not refer specifically to first-time offenders, and, as this article will show below, the 
measure was imposed on repeat offenders too. 
 29.  Sebba, supra note 14, at 144. 
 30.  DK (1953) 228, 231 (Isr.). Similarly, sentencing reform in Canada included conditional sentences 
and was driven in part by increased incarceration and concerns about capacity. See Webster & Doob, 
supra note 5, at 166; see also Freiberg, supra note 10, at 88 (citing rising prison populations as a motivating 
factor for increased use of community-based alternatives). 
 31.  The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Rep No. 54/C, 2d Knesset, at 2 (July 19, 1954). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, supra note 18, at 4. 
 34.  The Attorney General supposed that the suspended sentence would replace most of the fines 
that were imposed prior to the enactment. See The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Rep No. 
8/C, 2d Knesset, at 6 (Feb. 23, 1954). 
 35.  See DK (1953) 233 (Isr.) (statement by the minister of justice explaining that he expects 
suspended sentences to replace recognizances in some cases); see also DK (1953) 372 (Isr.). 
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effect of suspended sentences was to replace sentences of immediate 
imprisonment. 
C. The (Temporary) Success of Suspended Sentences in Reducing Incarceration 
When enacted, the new suspended sentencing clause directed judges to 
determine whether to condition (or suspend) the prison sentence they had 
decided to impose. This wording instructed judges to first decide whether an 
imprisonment sentence was needed and only then decide whether to suspend it.36 
This two-step process was meant to indicate to judges that a suspended prison 
sentence was still a prison sentence, and that only the activation of the sentence—
not its duration—should be altered through suspension.37 Hence, the Knesset 
required that the prison term still be proportional to the severity of the offense 
and not longer just because of its suspension.38 In other words, the term of the 
suspended sentence should be similar to the term that would have been imposed 
had the sentence been an immediate sentence.39 That way, if the sentence was 
activated, the term remained proportional. 
Initially, the Israeli Supreme Court seemed to accept this proposition.40 In a 
1957 decision, the Court made a clear distinction between criteria for setting the 
length of an imprisonment that adequately fit the severity of the offense, and the 
 
 36.  As this article shows above, the Knesset intended for suspended sentences to sometimes be 
imposed in cases where fines or a recognizance were previously used, and not merely as an alternative to 
imprisonment. Still the wording of the section did not fully reflect that intention. Supra text 
accompanying notes 34–35. 
 37.  In Canada, the wording of the law also required a two-step process. Still, the Supreme Court 
held “[t]he requirement in § 742.1(a) that the judge impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than two 
years does not require the judge to first impose a sentence of imprisonment for a fixed duration before 
considering whether that sentence can be served in the community.” Using purposive interpretation, the 
court also held “[a] conditional sentence need not be of equivalent duration to the sentence of 
incarceration that would otherwise have been imposed.” R. v. Proulx, (2000) 1 S.C.R. 61; see also Webster 
& Doob, supra note 5 at 173–174. 
 38.  See DK (1962) 15 (Isr.). The Minister of Justice criticized the conduct of the judges since they 
were imposing longer sentences simply because those sentences were suspended. He emphasized that the 
law was not meant to adversely affect offenders’’ positions. Supreme Court Justice Berenson also said in 
the parliamentary hearing that it was a mistake to impose a longer sentence just because of the decision 
to suspend it. See The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Rep No. 131, 5th Knesset, at 8 (Feb. 5, 
1963). 
 39.  See DK (1962) 12 (Isr.) (comments of M.K. Zadok). 
 40.  However, despite declaring that the sentence should not be longer because of its de facto 
suspension, in some cases the Supreme Court imposed longer suspended sentences when substituting for 
immediate imprisonment following appeals. See e.g., CA 138/57 Greenberger v. The Attorney General 
11 PD 1204 (1957) (Isr.) (sentencing the appellant to a three-month suspended sentence instead of one 
month of imprisonment); CA 90/58 Toledo v. The Attorney General 12 PD 932 (1958) (Isr.) (substituting 
a three-month prison sentence with a six-month suspended sentence); CA 149/55 Abu Shach v. The 
Attorney General 9 PD 1698, 1699 (1955) (Isr.) (substituting a six-month prison sentence with a twelve-
month suspended sentence). Webster and Doob discuss a similar shift in conversion rate that derived 
from their Supreme Court’s “purposive” interpretation of the legislation. In particular, “the rigid two-
step decision-making process was abandoned and judges were thereafter allowed (if not encouraged) to 
hand down conditional sentences that were longer than the terms of incarceration they were meant to 
replace.” Webster & Doob, supra note 5, at 174. 
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grounds for determining whether suspension of the sentence was appropriate.41 
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the appropriate sentence for the two 
defendants, both convicted of burglary, was nine months of imprisonment and 
that the three months imposed by the lower court was inappropriately lenient. 
Yet since these were the defendants’ first convictions, and taking into account 
their families’ situations (which were not specified) the Court determined that “it 
[was] justified, and hopefully also effective” to suspend the sentence; the 
defendants would only serve the sentence if they committed a felony or 
misdemeanor property offense in the following three years.42 In other words, the 
court held that the length of sentence should be determined by the severity of the 
offense alone and should not increase merely because the sentence was 
suspended.43 
In another decision, the Supreme Court expanded the use of suspended 
sentences beyond the original intended class of first-time offenders to include 
repeat offenders.44 Recall that during the legislative process, it was assumed that 
suspended sentences would mainly be used for first-time offenders. Yet the 
Knesset did not explicitly add such a requirement to the law. In this case, the 
Court suspended a prison term of eight months, despite the defendant’s record 
of previous offenses, because the defendant had found a steady job, which 
decreased the chance that he would reoffend.45 This case opened the door for 
suspending the sentences of repeat offenders, which resulted in a further 
reduction of sentences of immediate imprisonment overall. In 1963, the Knesset 
added an amendment clarifying that suspended sentences could be imposed on 
repeat offenders too.46 
As illustrated above, the case law indicates that suspended sentences mainly 
served to replace immediate imprisonment, even beyond the original legislative 
intent. Studies conducted shortly after the adoption of the law in 1954 show that 
suspended sentences did in fact mainly replace sentences of immediate 
imprisonment without creating a substantial widening of the net47—meaning 
without substantially replacing less intrusive penalties like fines and 
recognizance.48 In 1953, before the suspended sentence was adopted, 49 13.5% of 
sentences were for immediate imprisonment, while by 1955, this rate had 
 
 41.  C.A. 224/56 Hasan v. The Attorney General 11 PD 733, 735 (1957) (Isr.). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  CA 29/55 Mizrachi v. The Attorney General 9 PD 599, 599 (1955) (Isr.). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Section 18(c) to the Penal Law, following the 1963 amendment, states that “[u]nless the Court 
otherwise directs, the period of suspension shall begin on the date of the sentence or, where the sentenced 
person is serving a term of imprisonment at that time, on the date of his release from such imprisonment.” 
Penal Law Amendment (Modes of Punishment) (Amendment No. 5) Law, 5723–1963, § 18(c). 
 47.  For the problem of net-widening, see in this volume, Richard S. Frase, Suspended Sentences and 
Free-standing Probation Orders in U.S. Guidelines Systems: A Survey and Assessment, 82 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 201951; see also, Freiberg, supra note 10, 93. 
 48.  See Sebba, supra note 14, at 146, Table 5. 
 49.  The new law came into force on September 17, 1954. 
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decreased to only 5.2%.50 This sharp decrease was accompanied by a 
simultaneous increase in suspended sentences from 0% in 1953 to 9.5% in 1955, 
while the share of other types of sentences did not substantially change.51 
Additionally, in the first years following the amendment it seemed that this 
change was sustainable. The rate of immediate imprisonment sentences remained 
around 5% the decade following the enactment.52 As the Knesset intended, the 
adoption of suspended sentences did not initially impact the use of probation by 
replacing probation with suspended sentencing.53 
In sum, when suspended sentences were introduced in Israel, they primarily 
replaced immediate sentences. These initial results were very encouraging for 
those who hoped the introduction of alternative sanctions would help decrease 
incarceration. 
III 
FROM SUBSTITUTE TO SUPPLEMENT—THE INTRODUCTION OF PARTIAL 
SUSPENSION 
A. Partial Suspension Before 1963 
 As discussed, in the first decade after its introduction suspended sentences 
mainly replaced immediate imprisonment. Their use did not seem to substantially 
widen the enforcement net to cases that were unlikely to result in imprisonment 
before the enactment of the law. Yet the seeds for the drastic change in the 
function of suspended sentences were already planted in that first decade. 
Following decisions by the courts and the Knesset, which this article will describe 
below, by 1963 courts were allowed to partially suspend a sentence. De jure, this 
meant that judges, after deciding the term of imprisonment, suspended only part 
of it. De facto, as shown below, it allowed judges to add a suspended prison term 
to an immediate prison term. As a result, the main function of suspended 
sentences changed. Instead of replacing immediate imprisonment and other types 
 
 50.  See Sebba, supra note 14, at 146, Table 5. 
 51. At that time in the Magistrates’’ courts, there was an increase in the use of fines and an equally 
sizeable decrease in the use of recognizance. As Sebba (supra note 14, at 147–48) explained, the most 
probable explanation for these trends was that fines replaced recognizance and suspended sentences 
were mainly substituted for immediate imprisonment. However, in the district courts, suspended 
sentences also replaced fines. These were the cases mentioned by the Attorney General, in which the 
courts presumably thought fines inadequate but hesitated to impose immediate imprisonment, The 
Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Rep No. 8/C, supra note 34, at 6; see also The Minister of 
Justice, DK (1953) 233 (Isr.). Yet, since the overwhelming majority of cases were handled by the 
Magistrates’ Court as first instance, it is fair to say that only a few fines were replaced with suspended 
sentences. 
 52.  See O. SCHMELZ & D. SALZMAN, CRIMINAL STATISTICS IN ISRAEL 1949–1962, VOLUME II: 
ANALYSIS 198, Table 188 (Publication of the Institute of Criminology, Jerusalem 1964) (showing that 
between 1955 and 1960 the rate of immediate prison sentence was between 4.8% and 6.8%). In 1963-
1965 the rate of immediate imprisonment was between 4.4% and 5%. See The Criminal Statistic (1964; 
1965), Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series No. 247 at p. XXIII, Table X. 
 53.  See Sebba, supra note 14, at 150. 
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of penalties, they became mainly a supplement to imprisonment and other 
sentences. 
During the 1954 legislative session, one Member of the Knesset (M.K.) 
suggested allowing courts to suspend only part of a sentence.54 At that time, this 
proposal was rejected for several reasons: First, the suspended sentence was 
meant to show mercifulness toward the defendant, and the defendant would not 
feel that effect if he was still to be immediately incarcerated for part of the 
sentence.55 Second, if the suspension of the sentence could help correct the 
defendant’s ways, immediate imprisonment would not be useful—but if a 
suspended sentence could not improve his ways, then there was no benefit to be 
derived from suspending even part of the sentence.56 Third, there was concern 
that partial suspension would result in short immediate terms of incarceration 
supplemented by suspensions, and such short imprisonments are catastrophic to 
defendants and unhelpful to the state.57 As a result, the Knesset voted to reject 
the proposal to allow partial suspension.58 Yet despite this clear decision of the 
Knesset not to allow partial suspension, in several decisions the Supreme Court 
still decided to add a suspended sentence to immediate imprisonment.59 
By 1963, about 10% of suspended sentence verdicts were partial 
suspensions.60 As described below, instead of clarifying that this practice was 
contrary to the law, the Knesset amended the Penal Law to reflect the practice 
that had emerged. This Amendment is discussed in the next section. 
B. The 1963 Law—Partial Suspension 
In 1963 the Knesset revisited the issue of the suspended sentence. This was 
part of a comprehensive amendment to the Penal Law, including several sections 
regarding the suspended sentence.61 Many of the proposed changes were heavily 
debated.62 Yet one section in the bill—authorizing partial suspension of a 
 
 54.  See the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Rep No. 54/C, supra note 31 (comments by 
M.K. H. Rubin). 
 55.  See id. (comments by M.K. Y. Shapira). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  See id. (comments by the Attorney General); see Sebba, supra note 14, at 161–62; see also S. 
Shoham & M. Sandberg, Suspended Sentence in Israel, Bulletin of the Israeli Society of Criminology 18 
(1962) (Hebrew) (finding that breach is more likely following partial suspension and recommending 
prohibiting partial suspension). 
 58.  See DK (1954) 2675 (Isr.). 
 59.  See, e.g., CA 88/57 Fried v. The Attorney General 11 PD 910, 912 (1957) (Isr.) (upholding a 
sentence of two years in prison in addition to a two-year suspended sentence); CA 25/58 Greenberg v. 
The Attorney General 12 PD 481, 482 (1957) (Isr.) (rejecting the appeal and sentenced the offender to 
nine months in prison and an additional nine-month suspended sentence); CA 91/59 The Attorney 
General v. Hindi 13 PD 1007, 1008 (1957) (Isr.) (accepting the appeal and sentenced the offender to a 
six-month imprisonment in addition to a twelve-month suspended sentence). 
 60.  Sebba, supra note 14, at 163, Table 17. 
 61.  Penal Law Amendment (Modes of Punishment) (Amendment No. 5) Law, 5723–1963; see also 
Sebba, supra note 14, at 154 (reviewing the major amendments relating to suspended sentence). 
 62.  This amendment was discussed in eighteen meetings of the Constitution, Law and Justice 
Committee. See DK (1963) 1969 (Isr.). 
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sentence—passed with almost no debate at all.63 This lack of debate is somewhat 
surprising since the issue was extensively debated in 1954, during which the 
government and the Knesset gave several convincing reasons not to allow partial 
suspension.64 Moreover, several members of the Knesset and representatives of 
the Ministry of Justice participated in both the 1954 and 1963 debates. Still, they 
confirmed the amendment without discussing the potential consequences of such 
a fundamental change. 
The only reason the government gave in support of allowing partial 
suspended sentences was that they reflected the existing practice of the courts.65 
It is true that, before 1963, courts sometimes supplemented immediate 
imprisonment with suspended sentences despite a clear legislative directive to the 
contrary. However, the amendment did much more than simply acknowledge 
existing practice—it actively contributed to the rise of the practice. In the 1950s 
and early 1960s, only about 10% of suspended sentences were added to 
immediate imprisonment. Since suspended sentences were imposed in about 
10% of cases, the combination of suspended sentences and immediate 
imprisonment appeared only in about 1% of cases at that time. As will be shown 
in the next subsection, these numbers increased dramatically in the following 
decades. 
C. The Effect of the Partial Suspension 
Following the 1963 amendment, the law states that “when a Court imposes a 
penalty of imprisonment, it may—in the sentence—direct that all or part of that 
penalty be conditional.”66 With this, the Knesset allowed for partial suspension 
of a sentence and opened the door for a different use of suspended sentences: as 
a supplement to immediate imprisonment. While the amendment’s effect was not 
immediately apparent, the whole attitude toward suspended sentences changed 
dramatically as time passed. In 1956, 10% of the sentences in the Magistrate 
Courts, the entity in charge of more than 90% of the criminal cases,67 included 
 
 63.  See the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Rep No. 110, 5th Knesset, at 10A (Dec. 12, 
1962) (containing the only reference to the section allowing partial suspension, which was made by Mr. 
Shalgi, the representative of the Ministry of Justice, who said “courts, de facto are doing that anyway, so 
there is not real change”); see also the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Rep No. 115, 5th 
Knesset, at 10 (Dec. 26, 1962) (Judge Halevi mentioned that the most common sanction was a partial 
suspended sentence). 
 64.  See supra text accompanying notes 54–58. 
 65.  See the explanatory comment to the Penal Law Amendment (Modes of Punishment) 
(Amendment) Bill, 5722–1962, p. 252. 
 66.  Penal Law Amendment (Modes of Punishment) (Amendment No. 5) Law, 5723–1963, § 18(a) 
(emphasis added). The amendment came into force on June 13, 1963. The amended section can be found 
today in § 52 to the Israeli Penal Law. 
 67.  See SCHMELZ & SALZMAN, supra note 52, at 188, Table 177 (showing that about 93% of the 
criminal cases in 1956 were tried before the Magistrate courts). This rate has not changed substantially 
over the years. See THE ISRAELI JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 18, 26 (Apr. 23, 
2018), https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/statistics_annual_2017/he/annual2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5PSC-GKM9] (Hebrew) (showing that 42,966 of the 45,638 (~94%) criminal cases 
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suspended sentences.68 In the second half of the 1960s this number started rising, 
reaching 17% in 1970.69 While data for the second half of the 1970s is unavailable, 
by 1981, 49% of the sentences in the Magistrate Courts included a suspended 
sentence. 70 In 1990 it was 68.8%,71 and, in 2010, 85% of Magistrate Court 
sentences included a suspended sentence.72 
Yet these numbers do not reflect a shift from immediate imprisonment or 
other types of penalties to the suspended sentence. Only 15% of the sentences in 
the Magistrate Courts in 199273 and 18.8% in 201074 imposed a suspended 
sentence as the single sentence. In other cases, a suspended sentence was simply 
added to other types of penalties. A combined sentence of an immediate and a 
suspended sentence—sometimes with additional penalties—appeared in 15.9% 
of the sentences in 199275 and in 38.8% of the sentences in 2010.76 Recall that, in 
the first decade following the introduction of suspended sentence, only 1% of 
sentences included such combinations.77 Maybe even more revealing, in 1992, 
94.4% of the immediate imprisonment sentences in the Magistrate Courts were 
supplemented with a term of suspended sentence.78 This number increased to 
97% in 2010.79 These numbers tell the whole story: with an increase in partial 
suspensions, suspended sentences changed in function from primarily an 
alternative that avoided imprisonment, to a supplement to imprisonment. 
It is true that, in 2010—the last year with available data—about 18.8% of 
sentences in Magistrate Courts still included suspended sentences as the sole 
penalty. One might argue that at least these sentences substituted immediate 
imprisonment, and hence suspended sentences still assist in reducing 
incarceration. Yet for two reasons, this is unlikely. First, as this article will show 
 
recorded in 2017 (not including traffic offenses and juvenile cases) were tried before the Magistrate 
courts). 
 68.  Criminal Statistic (1955–56), Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series No. 81 at p. 32, Table 
15. 
 69.  Criminal Statistic (1970), Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series No. 417 at p. 22, Table 13. 
These criminal statistics, both then and now, do not appear on regular basis. 
 70.  Criminal Statistic (1981), Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series No. 742 at p. 48, Table 16. 
 71.  It apparently remained stable for a while because in 2000 it was 68.2%. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 
STATISTICS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL (2003), Chapter 11, Table 11.4, 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/templ_shnaton.html?num_tab=st11_04&CYear=2003 
[https://perma.cc/3PED-MTDH] (Hebrew) (last visited Dec. 24, 2018). 
 72.  OREN GAZAL-AYAL, ET AL., CONVICTION AND ACQUITTAL RATES IN ISRAEL 19, 21 (2012), 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/Research%20Division/doc/Research1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7CP-JMZ4] 
(Hebrew). 
 73.  Criminal Statistic (1992), Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series No. 988 at p. 64, Table 18. 
 74.  GAZAL-AYAL, ET AL., supra note 72, at 19. 
 75.  Criminal Statistic (1992), supra note 73, at 62, Table 17. 
 76.  Criminal Statistic (1992), supra note 73, at 64–65, Table 18. 
 77.  An estimated 1% of sentences included such a combination since 10% of sentences included 
suspended sentences, and one tenth of these sentences were added to a term of immediate imprisonment. 
These data refer to all of the courts, but as the Magistrates are responsible for more than 90% of the 
sentences, the gaps are probably small. 
 78.  Criminal Statistic (1992), supra note 73, at 62. 
 79.  GAZAL-AYAL, ET AL., supra note 72, at 19. 
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below, in recent years the Supreme Court has indicated that suspended sentences 
are not the substitute for immediate imprisonment that they once were. Second, 
since almost all sentences of immediate imprisonment are supplemented by 
suspended sentences, more suspended sentences are imposed, and therefore, 
more suspended sentences are activated, resulting in more imprisonment. The 
article turns now to these two issues. 
D. Suspended Sentences in Court Decisions After 1963 
This article has shown that, following the 1963 amendment, courts began to 
use suspended sentences primarily as a supplement to other penalties. Virtually 
all sentences of immediate imprisonment also began to include a term of 
suspended sentence, and with this change in function the court also changed its 
attitude toward suspended sentences.80 In 1985, the Supreme Court revisited the 
purposes of suspended sentences81 holding that there were two goals to 
suspended sentences: the first, to refrain from unwarranted incarceration of 
defendants; the second, to deter defendants from reoffending. The Court then 
held that the main purpose of suspended sentences is the second goal—
deterrence—while avoiding incarceration is only a secondary purpose.82 When 
the aim is mainly deterrence, it makes sense to supplement and not only 
substitute immediate imprisonment with a suspended sentence. 
In another development, the Supreme Court held that the suspended 
sentence is, in fact, a separate sentence from immediate imprisonment. Following 
the 2012 sentencing reform,83 courts are required to construct in each case a 
proportionate sentencing range to fit the seriousness of the offense committed 
and the degree of the offender’s culpability.84 Only then can the court impose the 
sentence, usually within this proportionate range, based on circumstances that 
are unrelated to the commission of the offense (including the defendant’s 
background or his behavior after committing the offense).85 Thus, the 
construction of the sentencing range is probably the most important part of the 
sentencing decision. In practice, courts usually only determine the range for the 
most severe type of penalty and then add other supplementary measures without 
setting ranges for these measures. For example, if the sentence includes 
imprisonment, the court first determines the range for imprisonment and then 
 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  CA 823/84 The State of Israel v. Harari 39(2) PD 393 (1985) (Isr.). 
 82.  Id. at 408; see also A.C.A 1553/15 Issa v. The “Samaria” Local Planning and Building Committee 
9–10 (Nevo 2017) (Isr.) (holding that the main purpose of the suspended sentence is deterrence). 
 83.  See Julian V. Roberts & Oren Gazal-Ayal, Statutory Sentencing Reform in Israel: Exploring the 
Sentencing Law of 2012, 46 ISR. L. REV. 455 (2013). 
 84.  Penal Law Amendment No. 113 5773–2012 § 40(b) 2337 LSI 170 (stating that: “[t]he guiding 
principle in sentencing is proportionality between the seriousness of the offence committed by the 
offender and the degree of his culpability, and the type and severity of his punishment”). 
 85.  In some cases the court may deviate from the sentencing range for rehabilitation or to preserve 
public safety. Sections 40(d) and 40(e) to the Penal Law (available in English in Roberts & Gazal-Ayal, 
supra note 83, at 476–77). 
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adds fines, probation, license disqualification, or other penalties, without 
constructing a range for the terms of probation and disqualification and the 
amount of the fine. 86 Determination of the severity of these measures is made 
regardless of the range. 
In the case of Yaniv Nachman, who was convicted of rape and indecent act 
offenses, the district court held that the sentencing range was four to six years of 
imprisonment but clarified that this range included the suspended part of the 
prison sentence.87 The result was that most of the prison sentence was suspended, 
and the defendant was sentenced to only six months of immediate imprisonment, 
in addition to the time served on remand. On appeal by the State, the Supreme 
Court heavily criticized the district court.88 The Court held that such a range 
means that the sentence can de facto range from a full suspended sentence to six 
years of immediate imprisonment, and that this range was too large.89 The 
Supreme Court held that sentencing courts must make a clear distinction 
between suspended sentences and sentences of immediate imprisonment when 
determining the sentencing range and should expressly specify the lower limit of 
the immediate imprisonment range.90 In this case, the Court held that the lower 
boundary of the range should be two years of immediate imprisonment.91 As 
usual, the other types of penalties including suspended sentence, fine, and 
compensation to the victims were imposed with no reference to the range, at the 
end of the written sentence.92 
In many ways, the Nachman decision only stated the way most courts had 
approached sentencing since the adoption of the 2012 sentencing reform. 
However, the decision is noteworthy in that it clarified for the first time that 
judges should distinguish between suspended sentences and immediate 
imprisonment in determining the sentencing range, and that when courts fit 
sentencing ranges to an offense’s severity, the range should primarily refer to 
immediate imprisonment, if the case requires such a sentence. Suspended 
sentences, as well as fines and other penalties, should only be added later as a 
supplement. It follows that when imprisonment is the proportional sentence, 
suspended sentences cannot be substituted for this sentence. Suspended 
sentences can either supplement imprisonment or serve as the main sentence 
when proportionality does not require immediate imprisonment. While the 
wording of the statue indicates that the prison sentence is a unified measure, and 
 
 86.  Probation can only be added to imprisonment served via service labor. See Probation Ordinance, 
§ 11(b)(1). 
 87.  DC (TA) S.C.C 39303-07-14 The State of Israel v. Nachman 9 (Nevo 2015) (Isr.). 
 88.  CA 1079/16 The State of Israel v. Nachman (Nevo 2016) (Isr.). 
 89.  Id. at 11. 
 90.  Id. at 12. 
 91.  Id. at 14. 
 92.  We know of only one case in which the Supreme Court determined a separate range for 
suspended sentence and fines, despite including immediate imprisonment in the range. CA 3677/13 
Alhurush v. The State of Israel (Nevo 2014) (Isr.). In all other cases, when the range includes immediate 
imprisonment, the court does not set a range for other types of penalties. 
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the court cansuspend all or part of this sentence, the Nachman court seems to 
adopt a different view.93 
It seems that today, the suspended sentence is only imposed as the sole 
penalty when the court holds that the severity of the offense does not require 
incarceration. As a result, if suspended sentences were abolished, courts would 
likely rely more on fines, probation, and recognizance and only rarely impose 
immediate imprisonment in cases in which suspended sentences are currently 
used as the sole penalty. Therefore, eliminating suspended sentences would 
probably not substantially increase the use of actual imprisonment: they would 
primarily be replaced by other supplemental sentences. Consequently, while 
suspended sentences were successful in replacing immediate incarceration when 
first adopted, decisions by the Knesset and the courts changed it from an 
alternative to incarceration to a supplemental measure. 
E. Activation of Suspended Sentences. 
One might argue that even if most suspended sentences take the place of 
other intermediate sanctions such as probation or fines, some (even if we cannot 
know exactly how many) probably do replace immediate imprisonment, such that 
their use still reduces overall incarceration. However, even if that is true, 
suspended sentences, as they operate today, are more likely to increase, rather 
than decrease, incarceration rates overall. Since a suspended sentence is added 
to almost every sentence, and some of suspended sentences are likely to be 
activated by a further offense, the total number activated suspended sentences is 
large. As shown in Part III (C), more than 90% of sentences of immediate 
imprisonment are supplemented by a suspended sentence, and many offenders 
breach the terms of suspension. How many? One study from the early days of 
suspended sentences in Israel found that 13.2% of suspended sentences are 
breached.94 Data from 1987 show that 33% of the prison sentences in the 
Magistrate Courts came from activation of suspended sentences.95 In 1992, about 
40% of prison sentences in the Magistrate Courts included activation of 
previously suspended sentence.96 Newer data that is available only for Magistrate 
Court sentencing show that 22–24% of the prison sentences in those lower courts 
came from activation of a suspended sentence.97 These data show that activated 
suspended sentences account for a substantial proportion of prison sentences. 
 
 93.  Hok HaOnshin (Penal Law) 5737–1977, § 52, SH No. 2067 p. 26 (Isr.), translated in 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/43289694.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/585TF6RP]. 
 94.  Shoham & Sandberg, supra note 57, at 24, Table 4. 
 95.  Criminal Statistic (1987), Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series No. 859 at 59, Table 16. 
 96.  Criminal Statistic (1992), supra note 73, at 62. 
 97.  Data from 2010 show that 24% of the imprisonment sentences included activated of previously 
imposed suspended sentence. See GAZAL-AYAL, ET AL., supra note 72, at 19. The authors of this article 
have analyzed data that were extracted from the police criminal records for a different study and found 
that of offenders sentenced in Magistrate Court, 22% in 2014 and 2015, and 23% in 2016 had a suspended 
sentence that was activated in the sentencing decision. Nevine Emmanuel & Oren Gazal-Ayal, 
““Punishment as Prize: The Case of Conditional Imprisonment Dataset”“ (unpublished dataset 2018). 
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Before inferring the precise effect of suspended sentence activation on the 
rate of incarceration, a few words about activation law and practices are 
necessary. When suspended sentences were introduced in 1954, courts had no 
discretion about whether to activate a suspended sentence. If the defendant 
committed any breach offense within the term of suspension, the court was bound 
to activate the full suspended sentence.98 The law considered every felony to be 
a breach offense, as well as certain misdemeanors specified in the original 
sentence.99 In the 1963 amendment, the legislature decided that, like 
misdemeanors, only felonies specified by the first sentencing court as breach 
offenses would lead to activation, thus somewhat reducing the number of 
activations by decreasing the number of triggering acts.100 
The 1963 amendment brought about another change in the activation law. 
Since judges tended to impose relatively long sentences when the sentence was 
to be suspended, offenders were often imprisoned for disproportionally long 
terms following minor breaches.101 Thus, the Knesset, after a long debate, allowed 
courts to prolong the suspension period after a breach, instead of automatically 
having to activate the sentence.102 However, this rule was supposed to be used as 
a rare exception, so prolonging the suspension was possible only where three 
cumulative conditions were met. First, no immediate prison sentence could have 
been imposed for the breach offense. This requirement was aimed at ensuring 
 
 98.  Sebba, supra note 14, at 159–60; Enker, supra note 14, at 376. 
 99.  Section 18(b) of the Penal Law Amendment 1954 determined: “A person who has been 
sentenced to suspended imprisonment will not bear his sentence unless he committed, within the period 
specified in the sentence, a felony or one of the misdemeanors specified in the sentence and has been 
convicted by a final judgment within the period or after it.” (translated in S. Shoham & M. Sandberg, 
Suspended Sentences In Israel: An Evaluation of the Preventive Efficacy of Prospective Imprisonment, 10 
CRIME & DELINQ. 74, 75 (1964). 
 100.  Penal Law Amendment (Modes of Punishment) (Amendment No. 5), 5723–1963, § 18(b) 
(available in English in Sebba, supra note 14, at 168–70). The statute provides that the conditions of 
suspension may be fixed by reference to the “. . .type of offences, or by description or by way of reference 
to the relevant provisions of law.” § 18(b), (d). However, contrary to the legislator’s intent, the Supreme 
Court held that the sentencing judge may decide conviction of any felony breaches the terms of 
suspension since ““felonies”“ is also type or category of offense within the meaning of the statute. CA 
296/72 Ben-David v. The State of Israel 27 (1) PD 671, 672 (1973) (Isr.). In Ben-David, the court 
substantially expanded the chance that defendants will breach the terms of their suspended sentences 
and again increased the likelihood of imprisonment. 
 101.  An example presented by M.K. E. Meridor exemplifies this trend. The story goes that, one 
Friday, Meridor received a phone call from a prison guard, who told him about an inmate serving a three-
year prison sentence following an activated suspended sentence after he was found guilty of Possession 
of a small amount of cannabis for personal use. The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Rep No. 
133, 5th Knesset, at 2 (Feb. 11, 1963). Another example cited by the Minister of Justice references a 
person who stole a small amount of money and was sentenced to a three-year suspended sentence. Two 
months before the end of his period of suspension, he committed a minor offense and the court had no 
choice but to activate the three-year sentence as originally pronounced. DK (1963) 1977 (Isr.). The 
Minister of Justice emphasized that many such cases existed. 
 102.  See The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Rep No. 142, 5th Knesset, at 2–7 (Mar. 6, 
1963); see also DK (1963) 1978 (Isr.) (confirming the amendment). 
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that this new power would only be used if the breach offense was a minor one.103 
Second, the activation of the sentence could not have been previously prolonged. 
If the defendant breached the terms of his suspended sentence twice, the court 
had to activate the sentence. Third, judges had to explain why it would be unjust 
to activate the sentence.104 The legislators assumed that, given these conditions, 
decisions not to activate a sentence would be very rare. 
This has not been the case. Data the authors of this article received for a 
different study show that in about 37% of sentences (2107 out of 5764) that 
followed a first breach of a suspended sentence of an adult offender, the court 
prolonged a suspension instead of activating the sentence.105 In fact, in some cases 
the court even refrained from imposing an immediate prison sentence for a 
breach offense just in order to meet the first required condition for avoiding 
activation.106 The high utilization of prolonging suspensions has likely mitigated 
the increase in imprisonment caused by activation of suspended sentences. 
Another mitigating factor is a judge’s power to impose sentences 
concurrently. The Penal Law states that the sentence for the breach offense and 
the activated suspended sentence should be imposed consecutively.107 Yet, the 
Penal Law authorized courts, “for reasons which shall be recorded in the 
sentencing decision,” to impose the two terms concurrently, in full or in part.108 
The data we received for a different study show that 27% of the activated 
sentences were imposed concurrently in full, and about 23.5% were imposed 
 
 103.  The Attorney General, in the parliamentary hearing, emphasized that the proposal was 
intended, inter alia, for minor offenses. See The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Rep No. 142, 
supra note 102, at 4. 
 104.  Penal Law Amendment 1963 § 18(d). 
 105.  Nevine Emmanuel & Oren Gazal-Ayal, ““Punishment as Prize: The Case of Conditional 
Imprisonment Dataset” (unpublished dataset 2018). 
 106.  See, e.g., CA 229/78 Saadia v. The State of Israel, 32 (3) PM 256, 267–68 (1978) (Isr.) The 
defendant stole a Jerrycan of gasoline and was sentenced to three years of suspended sentence. He 
committed a subsequent offense, and the court held that the sentence for the breach offense should be 
one year of immediate imprisonment. Though courts must activate a suspended sentence if they imposes 
imprisonment for the breach offense, the trial court erroneously extended the term of suspension while 
imposing one year of immediate imprisonment for the breach offense. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
held that activation of the three-year term of imprisonment was too harsh, and to preempt such activation 
substituted a fine for the imprisonment. See also CA 536/70 Kassir v. The State of Israel, 25 (1) PD 281, 
282 (1971) (Isr.). In this case, the three-year suspended sentence had already been extended once, so 
activation was mandatory. To avoid activation, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of treating the 
appeal against the activation order as an appeal against the original sentence. It extended the time for 
the filing of such an appeal—which had long since expired—altered the original order, and imposed three 
months immediate imprisonment in addition to three months imposed for further offense. In a separate 
study that the authors of this article conducted, they found that, for severe offenses, defendants with 
activatable suspended sentences are less likely to receive prison sentences for the breach offense than 
defendants without activatable suspended sentences, ceteris paribus. Nevine Emmanuel & Oren Gazal-
Ayal, Punishment as Prize: The Case of Conditional Imprisonment (unpublished manuscript 2018). 
 107.  Hok HaOnshin (Penal Law) 5737–1977, § 58, SH No. 2067 p. 28 (Isr.), translated in 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/43289694.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/585TF6RP]. 
 108.  Id. 
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concurrently in part.109 Once again, the exception seems to have become the rule. 
This policy of imposing sentences concurrently also mitigated the effect of 
activated suspended sentences on imprisonment by reducing the total amount of 
incarceration for individuals convicted of further offenses. 
Despite these exceptions, in most cases, when offenders breached the terms 
of their suspended sentences, the court activated the sentences and most of these 
activations were consecutive, at least in part. In these cases, the suspended 
sentences increased the overall imprisonment term. Moreover, following a 
second breach, activation is mandatory and thus, in cases of multiple breaches, 
suspended sentences certainly increase incarceration. Thus, even if some 
suspended sentences today replace immediate imprisonment, most of these 
sentences supplement other sanctions, and since they are often activated, 
suspended sentences are more likely to increase incarceration than decrease it. 
In sum, suspended sentences successfully reduced incarceration, but only 
temporarily. With the passage of time, the courts and the Knesset made what 
might have been seen at the time as minor changes, but which in fact 
fundamentally changed the way suspended sentences are used. Instead of mainly 
replacing immediate imprisonment orders, suspended sentences today mainly 
supplement immediate imprisonment and other types of penalties. Since many of 
these suspended sentences are later activated, it is likely that today the option to 
impose suspended sentences increases the number of incarcerated people, and 
hence this penalty, in the long run, fails to serve as an alternative to incarceration. 
IV 
SERVICE LABOR 
A. Service Labor as an Alternative to Prison 
While suspended sentences were originally supposed to replace both 
immediate imprisonment and sometimes other penalties, service labor was 
introduced with one objective in mind: to replace immediate imprisonment. 
An early version of service labor, called penal work, has existed in Israel since 
the time of the British mandate of Palestine.110 In this version, at the request of 
the convict, the police were authorized to offer a convict who was sentenced to 
up to three months’ imprisonment the opportunity to work daily for the duration 
of his sentence instead of being incarcerated.111 Only a few dozen prisoners were 
given this option every year.112 
In 1987, a modern version of service labor was introduced into the Penal 
Law.113 The 1987 amendment authorized the sentencing judge to determine that 
 
 109.  Nevine Emmanuel & Oren Gazal-Ayal, ““Punishment as Prize: The Case of Conditional 
Imprisonment  Dataset” (unpublished dataset, 2018). 
 110.  Penal Work Ordinance 1927. 
 111.  Id. § 2. 
 112.  See Penal Law (Amendment No. 25) Bill, 5746–1986, at 77 (Jan. 14, 1986). 
 113.  See Penal Law (Amendment No. 21), 5747–1987, at 80 (Apr. 9, 1987). 
111 - GAZAL-AYAL EMMANUEL - SUSPENDED SENTENCES ISRAEL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2019  3:10 PM 
128 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:111 
a prison sentence of up to six months could be served in total or in part via service 
labor.114 A convict sent to service labor is assigned to an employer by the prison 
authority and has to work five days a week for the duration of his prison sentence. 
115After the workday, he is not subject to specific restrictions. 
When introduced in the legislature, the bill made it clear that the aim of 
service labor was to reduce prison overcrowding and to avoid the “devastating 
drawbacks of short imprisonments.”116 In other words, service labor was 
supposed to be an alternative to incarceration rather than a new supplemental 
intermediate sanction. 
To ensure that service labor would be imposed only on people who would 
otherwise be sent to prison, the Knesset created several conditions. To use service 
labor, the court must first determine that the defendant is sentenced to immediate 
imprisonment; only then could the court consider whether his prison term should 
be served through service labor. Second, to ensure service labor is considered a 
way of serving a prison sentence and not an alternative sanction, a defendant that 
is sent to service labor is legally considered a prisoner, even though he is not in 
prison. This distinguishes service labor from probation and other types of 
community service that exist in Israel, which are supervised by social workers 
from the probation service rather than the prison authority.117 In the service labor 
context, if the prisoner does not fulfill his obligations properly, the prison 
authority can send him to serve the remainder of the term in actual prison.118 
Third, the sentencing court must request a report from the director of service 
labor either before or after handing down the sentence, and only based on this 
report can the judge order that the imprisonment will be served via service labor. 
Thus, the judge has the option to first determine the regular sentence in months, 
then ask for a report, and then decide whether the prison sentence will be served 
in prison or by way of service labor. This is another way to avoid net-widening by 
ensuring that service labor will only be imposed on those who would otherwise 
be sent to prison. 
Despite putting these mechanisms in place, a study conducted a few years 
after the introduction of service labor found that at least some net-widening 
nonetheless occurred. While the number of short incarceration sentences—
sentences of up to six months that were not converted to service labor—declined 
by about 100 cases per year, the number of people serving service labor was about 
 
 114.  Hok HaOnshin (Penal Law) 5737–1977, § 58, SH No. 2067 p. 28 (Isr.), translated in 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/43289694.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/585TF6RP]. 
 115.  Id. § 51F, p. 24. 
 116.  The Penal Law (Amendment No. 25) Bill, 5746–1986, at 76. 
 117.  Hok HaOnshin (Penal Law) 5737–1977, § 58, SH No. 2067 p. 28 (Isr.), translated in 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/43289694.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/585TF6RP]. 
 118.  Id. § 51I(a), p. 22. The service laborer may petition against a decision of the Prison 
Commissioner to the District Court. Id. § 51I(c)–(d). 
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ten times higher.119 Due to fluctuations in sentencing statistics, it is not possible 
to conclude that only 100 of the 1000 service labor orders served as substitutes 
for incarceration. Moreover, some service labor orders might have replaced 
longer terms of imprisonment.120 Still, the magnitude of difference in the numbers 
does indicate that service labor did more than just replace imprisonment. In fact, 
when prosecutors were asked in a questionnaire which sentences they thought 
service labor was meant to replace, they seemed to believe it was not prison 
sentence. About 60% of state prosecutors and 71% of police prosecutors replied 
that service labor could replace any sanction, including fines, probation, and 
suspended sentences.121 Judges were slightly more attuned to the legislature’s 
intent in their responses, though 35% of judges also agreed that service labor 
sometimes replaced non-custodial sanctions.122All in all, the study concluded that 
practitioners viewed service labor as sometimes replacing imprisonment but at 
other times replacing other, less severe sanctions, contrary to the legislature’s 
intent. Despite all attempts to avoid it, service labor seems to have created a 
substantial problem of unintended net-widening from the start. 
B. The First Reform of Service Labor 
Originally, the Penal Law required judges to first sentence a convict to a term 
of immediate imprisonment and only then send him to the director of service 
labor, to examine whether a type of service labor would be an appropriate 
alternative to imprisonment. Since service labor was meant to be a way of serving 
a prison sentence, this should not have been problematic—if the convict was 
found unfit for any service labor, he would simply serve the appropriate sentence 
of imprisonment. In reality, however, judges often sentenced defendants to a few 
months of imprisonment, even if they believed incarceration was inappropriate 
for the case, so they could later convert the sentence to service labor in 
accordance with the conditions prescribed in the Penal Law.123 
This was clearly not what the legislature had intended. Service labor should 
have been imposed only when the convict would have otherwise been sent to 
prison. By assigning service labor to cases that were inappropriate for prison on 
 
 119.  Bilha Sagiv, Serving Prison Sentences by “Service Work” as a Model for Prison Alternatives, 
218–19 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 216, Table 6.5. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  See CA 537/89 The State of Israel v. Avrahamien 43(4) PD 772, 778 (1989) (Isr.) (holding courts 
should usually request a report from the director of service work before issuing the sentence. That way 
they avoid a situation in which a court determines a term on the assumption that the defendant will serve 
it via service work, and later finds out that the defendant cannot serve his term in service work.) Yet, 
according to the law, if immediate imprisonment is unsuitable, the court should not impose service labor 
either, because service labor is merely a way of serving a prison sentence. Ergo, courts need not know 
whether the term will be served via service labor or incarceration when handing down the sentence. The 
insistence of the Supreme Court that courts will ask for the report before sentencing shows that the court 
believes that, in some cases, service labor does not replace a similar term of incarceration. 
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their merits, judges contributed to net-widening in contravention of the 
legislature’s intent. 
This improper practice was often revealed when judges first determined a 
prison sentence and only then received the service labor director’s negative 
report determining that the convict was unfit to perform service labor. At that 
point in time, the prison sentence was final, and the judges faced a dilemma. They 
could send the defendant to prison, which would be an excessive punishment, or 
they could force the director to accept an unfit convict into a service labor 
program. In practice, some judges chose the first alternative124 and others the 
second.125 
One solution to this dilemma would have been to instruct judges not to 
impose an excessive term of imprisonment just because they were planning on 
ordering that the term be served via service labor. Yet rather than issue this 
clarification, the Knesset chose a different path. In a 2009 amendment, the 
Knesset mandated that only after a judge had a report from the director of service 
labor could a defendant be sentenced and the decision whether service labor was 
appropriate be made.126 If the judge did not ask for such a report, service labor 
was not an option. In the bill’s explanatory notes, the amendment was 
rationalized as a way to prevent judges from imposing prison terms with the 
intent that the sentence would be served via service labor, only to find out later 
that the convict was unfit for service labor.127 
While this amendment solved the judges’ dilemma, it inadvertently 
legitimized the practice of excessive prison terms for defendants who served their 
term in service labor. The 1987 version of the law assumed that a prison term 
should be determined without regard to the possibility that the sentence could be 
served via service work.128 That is why judges did not have to know before 
sentencing whether service labor was a possibility or not. When the law requires 
 
 124.  See C.C. 2520/06 (Rehovot) The State of Israel v. Ben Shemoul (Lawdata 2008) (Isr.) 
(emphasizing how service labor is sometimes imposed when actual imprisonment is inappropriate, 
contrary to the original intent of the legislature); see also CA 10292/06 Ploni v. The State of Israel (Nevo 
2008) (Isr.) (accepting an appeal of two defendants who were sent to prison because they were unfit for 
service labor and holding that, while non-imprisonment sentence was too lenient, actual incarceration 
was too severe, and thus opting for the more lenient alternative sentence). 
 125.  See Penal Law (Amendment No. 101) (Serving Imprisonment by Service Labor) Bill, 5768–2008, 
582; see also The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Rep No. 13, 18th Knesset, at 9 (June 3, 2009) 
(the legal advisor of the Israel Prison Service discussing a case in which despite a negative report, the 
court ““forced”“ the director to find a service work for the convict because the sentence was already 
given); see also CA 779/08 Mosley v. The State of Israel (Nevo 2009) (Isr.) (determining, in a majority 
opinion, that the director should continue to look for an employee for a defendant that was sent to prison 
because he was found unfit to service labor, following a plea bargain in which the parties agreed he will 
be sent to service labor). 
 126.  See Penal Law (Amendment No. 102), 5769–2009, 240, § 51B(b)(1). 
 127.  See Penal Law (Amendment No. 101) (Serving Imprisonment by Service Labor) Bill, 5768–2008, 
582. 
 128.  However, one member of the Knesset argued that judges would sometimes impose a six-month 
imprisonment to be served via service labor even in cases where the appropriate sentence was 
imprisonment for a longer period (nine months or even a year), to avoid sending an offender to prison. 
See DK (1986) 10, 14 (Isr.) (comments of M.K. Shulamit Aloni). 
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them to know whether service labor is possible before sentencing, it assumes they 
will take this information into account. Hence, it assumes that a term of service 
labor should not simply be a way of serving an equal term of imprisonment. 
Though the wording of law still requires judges to see service labor as simply 
a way of serving a prison sentence, the structure of the law enables them to 
impose service labor even when imprisonment is inappropriate and to impose a 
longer term of imprisonment on convicts just because their sentence is to be 
served via service labor. As a result, net-widening—where more individuals are 
being assigned prison sentences and prison terms are longer—occurs just because 
judges know these terms will be served via service labor. If judges are only 
required to substitute one month of service labor for one month of incarceration, 
as the law requires, they do not need to know in advance whether service labor 
is possible at the time of sentencing. 
When the law requires judges to know whether service labor is possible 
before sentencing, it implicitly allows them to treat a sentence of imprisonment 
differently when it is served via service labor and not incarceration. As will be 
shown in the next section, after this amendment judges openly held that a month 
of prison was to be replaced by more than one month of service labor, and hence, 
in practice, service labor is no longer just a way of serving an equally long prison 
term. 
C. Adopting a Conversion Rate 
The 2009 amendment changed the order of the decisions in the sentencing 
process, but it did not change the legislative wording, according to which service 
labor was simply a way of serving a prison sentence. As before, if a convict is 
sentenced to up to six months of imprisonment, the court can order that these six 
months will be served via service labor, and if the convict does not preform his 
service labor properly, the director can decide to send him to serve his remaining 
term of imprisonment behind bars. The only legal difference between serving a 
prison term in prison rather than through service labor is that incarcerated 
prisoners can be released on parole after serving two-thirds of their sentence, if 
they deserve an early release. Outside of this, they are meant to be equivalent 
sanctions: one month of service labor is a way of serving one month of a prison 
sentence.129 
Yet judges found it hard to accept this legislated 1:1 ratio. Usually it is 
impossible to know what the sentence would have been if the judge thought the 
defendant would be serving it behind bars and not via service labor. Nevertheless, 
 
 129.  There are several clear indicators in the law supporting the 1:1 ratio between imprisonment 
behind bars and imprisonment served via service labor. First, the fact that the law states that only when 
the court sentences the defendant to a term of up to six months of imprisonment may it decide that the 
term should be served by way of service labor. This means that six months of imprisonment are served 
via six months of service labor. Second, if the convict does not report to work, he is sent, following an 
administrative decision, to serve the remainder of his term in prison. § 51I(a) of the Penal Law. Again, 
one month of service labor is converted to one month of imprisonment in each of these cases. The mere 
fact that service labor is a way of serving a prison sentence indicates that the ratio should be 1:1. 
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in some instances, a conversion rate—converting prison time into a longer period 
of service labor time—has surfaced. In one appeals case, a panel of judges in the 
Tel Aviv District Court sentenced two defendants for a violation of the 
Prohibition of Violence in Sports Law.130 One of the defendants was sentenced 
to two months of imprisonment, to be served via service labor. The other, who 
was found to be unfit for service labor, was only sentenced to one month of 
imprisonment for the same offense. The court’s holding indicated that this 
shorter sentence was justified because of the difference between a prison 
sentence served via service labor and a sentence served behind bars.131 Several 
other decisions also adopted a ratio of 1:2132 or 1:3 in similar situations.133 The 
Supreme Court even openly opted for a 1:2 conversion rate in one case, replacing, 
on appeal, a three-month sentence of imprisonment to be served behind bars with 
six months of service labor.134 The initial intent of the legislature to substitute six 
months of service labor for six months of imprisonment has failed. 
D. The Dorner Report and the 2018 Reform 
In 2015, a public committee for the examination of penal policies, headed by 
former Supreme Court Justice Dalia Dorner, published its report, the Dorner 
Report.135 The Dorner Report called for shortening long prison terms and for 
greater use of alternatives to incarceration. Among its recommendations, the 
committee stated that imprisonment rates in Israel should be reduced since the 
current high rates were costly and probably did not lead to lower rates of crime.136 
On the issue of service labor, the committee recommended authorizing the 
courts to order that prison sentences of up to nine months (instead of six months) 
can be served by way of service labor.137 However, the committee also raised 
concerns that judges would impose nine months of service labor in cases that 
 
 130.  DC (TA) CA 60751-12-15 The State of Israel v. Mizrachi (Nevo 2016) (Isr.). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  DC (Jer) C.C. 18158-01-14 The State of Israel v. Ploni (Nevo 2017) (Isr.) (accepting the petition 
of two offenders to convert six months of service labor to three months of immediate imprisonment, 
despite the objections of the prosecutor. The offenders asked to go to prison in order to shorten the 
sentence in a way that would not stand in their way to start school or work on time.). 
 133.  DC (TA) CA 25366-03-16 Barbie v. The State of Israel (Nevo 2017) (Isr.). 
 134.  CA 5857/16 Mahmali v. The State of Israel (Judicial Authority 2018) (Isr.). 
 135.  Sharon Pulwer, Israeli Panel Calls for Shorter Jail Terms, Improved Rehab for Offenders, 
HAARETZ (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-panel-calls-to-shorten-jail-
terms-improve-rehab-1.5416699 [https://perma.cc/J42S-2QWV]. For the full report in Hebrew, see THE 
PUBLIC COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE PENAL POLICY AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, REPORT 
(2015), http://www.justice.gov.il/Units/SanegoriaZiborit/News/Documents/dorner%20report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B6HF-P7M5] [hereinafter DORNER REPORT]. 
 136.  DORNER REPORT, supra note 135, at 28 (“Based on the above, the committee is of the opinion 
that an action is needed to reduce the use of imprisonment when imprisonment is not necessarily needed 
for incapacitation of offenders who are of high risk to the society, and to increase the use of less expensive 
and more effective penalties that do not violate the principle of proportionality, and thus bring about a 
more efficient use of the resources directed for the issue.”). 
 137.  Id. at 68. 
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currently result in six months of service labor instead of replacing actual prison 
sentences with longer service labor sentences.138 The committee explained: 
Authorizing courts to order that sentences of more than six months will be served via 
service labor might result in the imposition of more than six months of service labor on 
defendants who would otherwise be sentenced to six months of service labor. In this 
case, the longer terms of service labor would not lead to reduction in incarceration. 
Moreover, there is a concern that when a judge will decide that the defendant deserves 
a sentence of imprisonment behind bars, he will choose a longer term of imprisonment, 
one that cannot be served via service labor, and as a result, imprisonment terms will be 
longer. It is true that judges can decide to impose shorter terms of imprisonment and 
still refrain from ordering that they are served via service labor, but they might still 
prefer to set a term that cannot be replaced with service labor, and hence impose longer 
sentences. Additionally, according to the discussion above, it will be harder on 
defendants serving longer terms of service labor to complete their duties, and hence 
more defendants will breach the service labor order and will be sent to prison for the 
remaining of the sentence, after the breach. These consequences, if materialized, will 
undermine the purpose for which we consider prolonging the maximum term of service 
labor—which is reducing incarceration.139 
In other words, since longer periods of service labor are more likely to be 
breached, and convicts are more likely to serve the remainder of their sentence 
in prison after such a breach, the proposed change might result in more instead 
of less imprisonment and be counterproductive. In this way, the majority opinion 
in the committee stated that the recommended change would only be justified if 
the convict sent to service labor would be eligible for parole after serving two-
thirds of their sentence, like incarcerated convicts.140 With early release for 
convicts doing service labor, the risk of net-widening can be reduced. A minority 
opinion of four members of the committee argued against early release for 
convicts doing service labor.141 
The committee’s recommendation was brought before the Knesset by way of 
a proposed amendment to the law.142 The representative of the Attorney General 
argued that if early release was allowed, prosecutors and courts would not be 
willing to replace longer prison sentences with service labor since they would 
deem the sentence to be too lenient.143 One of the authors of this article, who was 
also the coordinator of the Dorner Committee, argued in the hearings that, 
without early release, prolonging service labor might result in higher rates of 
breach and, hence, more imprisonment.144After four hearings dedicated to that 
debate, the Knesset, in July of 2018, adopted a compromise allowing early release 
 
 138.  Id. at 62–63. 
 139.  Id. at 63. 
 140.  Id. at 64–5. 
 141.  Id. at 66. The members of the minority opinion were the deputy attorney general, the deputy 
state attorney, and the representatives of the prison service and police. 
 142.  The Penal Law (Serving Imprisonment by Service Labor—Temporary Order) Bill, 5777–2016, 
654. 
 143.  See The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee Rep No. 589, 20th Knesset, at 9–10 (Apr. 30, 
2018). 
 144.  See The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee Rep No. 655, 20th Knesset, at 18 (July 3, 
2018). 
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of up to six weeks, instead of three months, for prisoners sentenced to more than 
six months of service labor who performed their duties properly and complied 
with a rehabilitation program (if one was set for them).145 
This new reform will come into effect in March of 2019 for a period of two 
years. The Ministry of Justice plans to accompany the legal change with research 
examining to what extent the new and longer service labor sentences will replace 
incarceration and to what extent they will replace shorter service labor sentences. 
This research is supposed to determine whether the new reform has succeeded in 
reducing incarceration, which is the professed aim of the amendment.146 Only 
time will tell what the effects of this latest amendment are, but the debate in the 
Knesset indicates that the attempts to replace imprisonment with an equal term 
of service labor have failed. No one today is trying to revive the original goal of 
service labor: replacing short prison terms with service labor at a conversion rate 
of 1:1. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
As more evidence and information about the social and economic harm of 
mass incarceration emerges, many jurisdictions around the globe struggle to 
reduce their prison populations.147 One of the most obvious ways of achieving this 
goal is developing alternatives to imprisonment. Yet research indicates that these 
alternative sanctions, even if designed to replace imprisonment, often replace 
other, less severe sentences and frequently widen the net of social control.148 As 
a result, when new alternatives are introduced, significant attention is directed 
toward research examining the effectiveness of the new measure in reducing 
imprisonment. Studies may utilize a before-and-after analysis to determine 
whether and to what extent the new sanction reduces imprisonment. 
 
 145.  The Penal Law (Amendment No. 133–Temporary Order), 5778–2018, 886 (July 26, 2018). 
 146.  The Penal Law (Serving Imprisonment by Service Labor–Temporary Order) Bill, 5777–2016, 
654. 
 147.  See generally The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and 
Consequences, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC (2014), https://johnjay. 
jjay.cuny.edu/nrc/NAS_report_on_incarceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W6E-VXCY]. For a 
review of studies examining the differences between nations and cultures see Sebba, supra 
note 1, at 258–60. See also Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Community Sanctions as Substitutes to 
Imprisonment in the Nordic Countries, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2018, 17,  17–18; Hans-
Jörg Albrecht, Sentencing in Germany: Explaining Long-term Stability in the Structure of 
Criminal Sanctions and Sentencing, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2013, 211–36. 
 148.  Bottoms, supra note 2, at 8–9; see generally Julian V. Roberts & Andrew Ashworth, The 
Evolution of Sentencing Policy and Practice in England and Wales, 2003–2015, 10–20 (University of 
Chicago, 2016) (ebook); Keir Irwin-Rogers & Julian V. Roberts, The Suspended Sentence Order in 
England and Wales, 2004-2017, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2018, at 144. In New Zealand 
suspended sentences were abolished in 2002, as they led to increased rates of incarceration as a result of 
net-widening. Philip Spier, CONVICTION AND SENTENCING OF OFFENDERS IN NEW ZEALAND: 1989 TO 
1997, 109–16, 140 (1998); see also Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2002 (NZ). For a similar discussion 
in Australia, see Freiberg, supra note 10, notes 89–91. 
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The two Israeli case studies discussed in this article demonstrate that reliance 
on such research should proceed with caution. In some cases, new intermediate 
sanctions might succeed in replacing prison sentences immediately after their 
adoption. However, with the passage of time, the memory of their original 
purpose might erode, judges might change the way they use the intermediate 
sanctions, and the legislature might amend the law, disregarding the original 
intent behind the sanction. As a result, instead of reducing imprisonment, new 
measures might actually increase imprisonment. 
After highlighting the difficulty of relying on alternative to imprisonment as 
a means for reducing imprisonment, one might expect us to propose possible 
solutions. Unfortunately, we have none. Despite trying, we failed to come up with 
measures that legislatures can take to ensure that alternatives to imprisonment 
will replace prison sentences in the long run. It might be argued that if legislatures 
clarify the purpose of the alternative in the wording of the law, courts will abide 
by it.149 Yet there is no indication that such statements in the code would achieve 
their goal. In fact, the Israeli service labor legislation was very clear about its 
purpose and still failed to achieve it. 
Alternatively, one could suggest that the decision to substitute an alternative 
for imprisonment should be done only after the judge hands out the sentence. 
For example, electronic monitoring enforcement programs in Denmark, Norway, 
and Sweden allow the prison authority, and not the sentencing judge, to convert 
the prison sentence to an electronic monitoring sentence after the court process 
is over.150 That way, the judge who imposes the prison sentence is behind a veil 
of ignorance and cannot be sure whether the sentence will be converted, and 
hence cannot impose the alternative on defendants who would have been 
otherwise sentenced to a less severe sanction. Yet a law placing so much power 
in the hands of a non-judicial body is constitutionally problematic. Moreover, 
judges might find ways to influence the administrative decisions.151 Judges might 
also learn over time under which circumstances prison terms are converted to the 
alternative measure and make decisions accordingly. Again, the pre-2009 Israeli 
service labor example shows that judges sent defendants to prison merely 
because they assumed that the prison term will be converted to service labor.152 
 
 149.  Lynch, supra note 9; see also Bottoms, supra note 2, at 9 (criticizing the Home Secretary for not 
clarifying in the wording of the statue that suspended sentences were supposed to replace imprisonment 
sentences). 
 150.  See Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 147, at 39. 
 151.  For example, before the 1987 amendment the Israeli police had the power to convert short 
imprisonment sentences (of up to three months) into “penal labor” (the earlier version of service labor). 
When defendants wanted their sentence to be converted, they asked the sentencing judge to postpone 
their date for entering prison, to allow the police more time to consider their request. A study shows a 
high correlation between the judges’ decisions in response to that request and the police decision to 
convert the sentence. In 88% of cases where a judge decided to postpone incarceration, the police 
converted the sentence. See Naomi Pugatsch & Zion Tucson, Penal Work—An Alternative to 
Imprisonment, 9 DELINQ. & SOC. DEVIANCE 102, 108 (1981) (Hebrew). 
 152.  CA 537/89 The State of Israel v. Avrahamien 43(4) PD 772, 778 (1989) (Isr.). 
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A third option would require judges to convert prison sentences up to a 
certain term. Yet the English attempt to do this shows that in some cases such a 
rule leads judges to impose longer prison sentences when they believe that prison 
is required, in order to bypass the rule.153  The Dorner Report, too, presented a 
similar concern that judges would send defendants to longer terms if they are 
instructed to convert short terms of imprisonment to alternatives.154 
All in all, it seems that even when the measures succeed in reducing 
imprisonment in the short term, legislation cannot really trick judges into using 
the alternative to imprisonment as designed in the long term. It is even more 
difficult to discourage future legislatures from retrospectively endorsing the way 
judges utilize the law when amending it at a later stage, and de facto changing its 
purpose. This article thus tends to conclude that adopting alternatives to 
imprisonment is not an effective way to reduce incarceration. When the goal is to 
reduce the use of incarceration, one should probably look for the solution 
elsewhere. 
That does not mean that intermediate sanctions are unnecessary. One might 
advocate using suspended sentences, community sentences, and many other 
noncustodial sanctions in order to increase the spectrum of available penalties 
and allow variety of measures to better fit the offenses and offenders. It does, 
however, mean that it is often wrong to call these intermediate sanctions 
alternatives to imprisonment. 
 
 
 153.  See Bottoms, supra note 2, at 7 (showing that in some cases courts imposed longer term of 
imprisonment in order to avoid the 1967 Act’s provisions that required suspending short sentences). 
 154.  DORNER REPORT, supra note 135, at 63. 
